Garnett, Michael (2013) Freedom and unpredictability. Inquiry 56 (6), pp. 666-680. ISSN 0020-174X.
This is the latest version of this item.
|
Text
Freedom and Unpredictability 6 [Final Draft].pdf - Author's Accepted Manuscript Download (218kB) | Preview |
Abstract
In A Metaphysics for Freedom (2012), Helen Steward proposes and defends a novel version of the libertarian account of free action. Amongst several objections that she considers to her view, one that looms particularly large is the Challenge from Chance: ‘the most powerful, widely-promulgated and important line of anti-libertarian reasoning’ (2012: 125). This paper begins by arguing that Steward’s response to the Challenge (or, at least, to one strand of it) is not fully convincing. It then goes on to explore a further possible libertarian line of defence against the Challenge, arguing that it, too, ultimately fails. The conclusion is that the Challenge remains an important source of dialectical advantage for the compatibilist.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Michael Garnett |
| Date Deposited: | 10 Oct 2013 10:49 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:07 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/8422 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Freedom and unpredictability. (deposited 10 Oct 2013 10:49) [Currently Displayed]
Statistics
Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.
Archive Staff Only (login required)
