Lillehammer, Hallvard (2011) The epistemology of ethical intuitions. Philosophy 86 (02), pp. 175-200. ISSN 0031-8191.
Abstract
Intuitions are widely assumed to play an important evidential role in ethical inquiry. In this paper I critically discuss a recently influential claim that the epistemological credentials of ethical intuitions are undermined by their causal pedigree and functional role. I argue that this claim is exaggerated. In the course of doing so I argue that the challenge to ethical intuitions embodied in this claim should be understood not only as a narrowly epistemological challenge, but also as a substantially ethical one. I argue that this fact illuminates the epistemology of ethical intuitions.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Apr 2014 11:29 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:10 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/9538 |
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