Monetary policy, the provision of financial stability and banking supervision

Sibert, Anne (2012) Monetary policy, the provision of financial stability and banking supervision. Other. European Parliament.

Abstract

This note discusses why it might be desirable for a central bank to have a microprudential supervisory role and why a single micro-prudential supervisor might be better than a collection of national supervisors. It argues that central banks should not be macro-prudential supervisors. It describes the skills that are necessary when a central bank is the provider of financial stability and the bank supervisor, as well as the monetary policy maker. It describes the institutional features of a central bank that are necessary if providing financial stability and bank supervision are to be regarded as legitimate roles for the central bank in a democratic society. It suggests how the accountability that is necessary for carrying out these political tasks can be squared with the independence required for monetary policy.

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