Lillehammer, Hallvard (2014) Moral testimony, moral virtue and the value of autonomy. The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1), pp. 111-127. ISSN 1467-8349.
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Abstract
According to some, taking moral testimony is a potentially decent way to exercise one’s moral agency. According to others, it amounts to a failure to live up to minimal standards of moral worth. What’s the issue? Is it conceptual or empirical? Is it epistemological or moral? Is there a ‘puzzle’ of moral testimony; or are there many, or none? I argue that there is no distinctive puzzle of moral testimony. The question of its legitimacy is as much a moral or political as an epistemological question. Its answer is as much a matter of contingent empirical fact as a matter of a priori necessity. In the background is a mixture of normative and descriptive issues, including the value of autonomy, the nature of legitimate authority, and who to trust.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This is the accepted version of the article, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2014.00235.x |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Hallvard Lillehammer |
| Date Deposited: | 11 Jun 2014 07:22 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:11 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/9925 |
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