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    Moral testimony, moral virtue and the value of autonomy

    Lillehammer, Hallvard (2014) Moral testimony, moral virtue and the value of autonomy. The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1), pp. 111-127. ISSN 1467-8349.

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    According to some, taking moral testimony is a potentially decent way to exercise one’s moral agency. According to others, it amounts to a failure to live up to minimal standards of moral worth. What’s the issue? Is it conceptual or empirical? Is it epistemological or moral? Is there a ‘puzzle’ of moral testimony; or are there many, or none? I argue that there is no distinctive puzzle of moral testimony. The question of its legitimacy is as much a moral or political as an epistemological question. Its answer is as much a matter of contingent empirical fact as a matter of a priori necessity. In the background is a mixture of normative and descriptive issues, including the value of autonomy, the nature of legitimate authority, and who to trust.


    Item Type: Article
    Additional Information: This is the accepted version of the article, which has been published in final form at
    School: Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies
    Depositing User: Hallvard Lillehammer
    Date Deposited: 11 Jun 2014 07:22
    Last Modified: 02 Aug 2023 17:11


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