Diamantopoulos, Angelos (2022) Essays in dynamic games of information and risk sharing. PhD thesis, Birkbeck, University of London.
|
Text
PhD_Angelos Diamantopoulos.pdf - Full Version Download (918kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters on dynamic games. In the first chapter we consider a dynamic model where a principal delegates learning about the unknown binary state of the world to a biased expert. We find that when preferences of the principal and the expert are sufficiently closely aligned, retaining some decision making authority may be detrimental for the principal. The second chapter develops a model that captures risk taking behaviour of banks. We characterise the unique NE in which banks endogenise the systemic consequence of their actions. In the third chapter we create an algorithm to simulate a risk sharing agreement between two parties that both produce a perishable good. Production is privately known and the parties cannot commit to a long-term contract. We estimate the expected gains of this agreement compared to the case of no sharing. The results can be used to quantify the opportunity cost of not setting a bilaterally-trusted independent authority that monitors and publicly reports electricity generation between two developing countries that want to share electricity.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Thesis |
|---|---|
| Copyright Holders: | The copyright of this thesis rests with the author, who asserts his/her right to be known as such according to the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988. No dealing with the thesis contrary to the copyright or moral rights of the author is permitted. |
| Depositing User: | Acquisitions And Metadata |
| Date Deposited: | 11 Jan 2023 12:05 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Nov 2023 16:00 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/50424 |
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.18743/PUB.00050424 |
Statistics
Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.
Archive Staff Only (login required)
